Vulnerability Remediation: What's Stopping the Fix?

Aaron Momin

Chief Information Security Officer,Synechron

Cybersecurity

Summary:

  • AI-assisted discovery now surfaces critical vulnerabilities faster than organizations can close them: frontier models recently found more than 10,000 critical flaws in production codebases, and 99% remain unpatched.
  • Vulnerability remediation takes weeks because of what surrounds the code change, not the code change itself. A fix can be identified, understood and written in hours.
  • The delay accumulates across four things: ownership split between security, engineering, release (including functional testing) and risk; engineering capacity committed before the finding arrived; hours lost to validating scanner output; and the confidence required to change a business-critical system safely.
  • Synechron RAPID is an agentic AI accelerator for application vulnerability remediation. It was designed around those constraints rather than around faster patch generation.

Vulnerability remediation is treated as an engineering problem, so it gets measured as one. But a one-line fix and a complex one can both take weeks to reach production, suggesting that something other than engineering is setting the clock.

Frontier AI models recently surfaced more than 10,000 critical flaws in real codebases and wrote working exploits for many. 99% remain unpatched. Discovery has been industrialized and closure has not moved with it, which puts the constraint somewhere other than in finding the problem.

A vulnerability can be identified, understood and scoped for a fix, and still take weeks to close. Almost none of that time is spent writing the fix. Which makes the first useful question one that most remediation programs never formally answer: What is preventing this fix from reaching production?

The answers are usually organizational, and rarely the same twice.

Who Actually Owns the Fix?

Responsibility for a vulnerability is distributed. Typically, security identifies the issue. Engineering owns the affected code. A separate team controls its release. Risk becomes involved when remediation is delayed or an exception is needed. By the time somebody can make the change, the finding has crossed four teams, each with its own priorities and queue.

That distribution is deliberate, and few organizations would want it otherwise. The problem is that owning part of the process is not the same as owning the outcome. Security can identify an issue without the authority to change it. Engineering can own the code without the capacity to touch it.

It also changes the question around speed. Making one team faster achieves little if the work only reaches the next queue sooner.

Capacity Is Spoken for Before the Finding Arrives

A vulnerability found today may sit inside an application built years ago. Fixing it creates work that did not exist when the sprint was planned. Unless capacity has been set aside in advance, the fix competes with everything the team was already committed to, and it competes from behind.

The security capacity that does exist often goes somewhere other than remediation. Static analysis produces large volumes of false positive findings that are not reachable, or exploitable, and someone must sort them before any fix begins. Engineers spend scarce hours disproving alerts rather than closing exposures. Expanding scanning coverage adds findings to a process already constrained at validation, which lengthens the queue rather than shortening it.

This is how known vulnerabilities become old ones. A fix can be accepted as necessary without ever becoming the most urgent thing in front of the team that has to make it.

Knowing Something Is Wrong Is Not the Same as Knowing How It Should Work

Some vulnerabilities depend on an understanding of the application rather than of the code. Broken access control, insecure direct object references and privilege escalation are the clearest examples. Addressing them safely requires an engineer to understand how the authorization model is supposed to behave. What was the intended permission model? Is this behavior a vulnerability, or a legitimate business requirement that looks like one?

Those answers are not visible in the vulnerable code, and the engineer looking at the finding today often did not write it. Whoever holds that context has likely moved elsewhere in the organization or left it. Remediation then involves reconstructing enough of the application's intent to make a safe change, which is different work from locating the vulnerable line.

Ten Minutes of Coding Doesn't Mean Ten Minutes of Remediation

Even after the right fix has been made, there is distance left to travel. The change moves through existing testing and release processes, which for some systems means lengthy regression testing, formal change approval and a defined release window. Those controls cannot be set aside in the name of speed, particularly where the application is business critical.

A developer could make the change quickly. The organization still needs enough confidence to put it into production, and with older or more sensitive applications that confidence is difficult to establish. Teams know that leaving vulnerable code in place carries risk, and that changing a critical system without understanding the consequences carries risk of its own. So, the difficult question is often not whether a vulnerability can be fixed, but whether the fix can be introduced safely.

Looking Beyond the Patch

This is where our thinking about Synechron RAPID started.

The obvious opportunity was to use AI to produce fixes faster. But accelerating the code change alone would leave most of the delay untouched. So, we looked at what happens around the change instead. How much engineering time goes to validation before useful remediation work can begin? How much application context can be recovered to inform the fix? Can a team establish a reliable picture of system behavior before a change, then use that same picture to understand what the change did?

There is no single bottleneck to remove. Remediation runs from confirming a real vulnerability to safely closing it, and the code change sits somewhere in the middle. Saving hours at one stage is worth little if the finding then waits weeks at the next.

Which returns to the question at the start. What is preventing this fix from reaching production?

The answer will not always be code.

The Author

Aaron Momin
Aaron Momin

Chief Information Security Officer

Aaron is Synechron’s Chief Information Security Officer. He oversees the execution of Synechron's worldwide information security strategy and information security program. Aaron possesses nearly three decades of extensive experience in cyber risk, IT risk, information security, and business continuity planning. He most recently served as the Chief Information Security Officer at Certinia. Over the years, Aaron has also held significant positions at prestigious global consulting firms. He was a Managing Director at PwC and held managerial roles in security at both Ernst & Young and Accenture.